Beta-VHS Annual Production and Cumulative Shares, 1975 Shares, -1988 Units: (A) = annual production in thousands of units; (B) = cumulative production in thousands of units; (C) = share of total VHS and Beta production/share of total VHS and Beta cumulative production in percent that lead in creating the necessary systems and investments for successful mass production and mass distribution. 6 With technologies and markets that require years to develop, being the inventor or first mover in commercialization may not be as useful as coming into the market second or third, as long as the rapid followers have comparable technical abilities, which usually result from having been among the pioneers who participated in 6 This definition of "first movers" is used in Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and developing the technology for commercial applications.7 These firms, which, along with the inventors, are also technological pioneers, may follow the first mover quickly enough to neutralize its advantages while still exploiting the benefits that come from being a leader in creating the set of complementary assets in manufacturing, marketing, and distribution needed for market domi- nance.8 For example, rapid followers who are also pioneers should be able to copy the best features of the first product while adding others to differentiate their offerings. They may have better information about buyer preferences after watching early consumer reactions and have more time to plan for manufacturing, distribution, licensing, or the use of complementary products and services. Follower pioneers and later entrants may also exploit investments made by the first mover, such as in solving engineering and manufacturing problems (if the solutions become public knowledge) or in educating buyers in the use of a new product (as occurred with the video recorder and the personal computer). They may benefit as well from the mistakes or inflexibility of the first mover as the market develops and the technology changes.9
BETA
In a mass consumer market, the time required to create a dominant standard may be so great that first-mover advantages are minimal, especially for products subject to what economists and others have termed "bandwagon" effects and "network externalities." The bandwagon effect refers to situations where early sales or licensing of a particular product lead (either accidentally or deliberately) to rising interest in that product. A momentum builds up that encourages other potential licensees, distributors, and customers to support the product that seems most likely to become the industry standard, regardless of whether it is technically superior, cheaper, or "better" in other ways than alternatives. The support for one standard over another can become especially dynamic and self-reinforcing if, for reasons apart from the main product itself (such as the need for and relative availability of a complementary product like software programs for computers or prerecorded tapes for VCRs), customers perceive value in owning the standard that becomes the most commonly available in the industry. Network externalities refer to whether or not there is a usage pattern that depends on such a complementary product, as well as to how and how much customers use it with the main While a market is unfolding, both early and later entrants can maneuver to establish a sustainable winning position before the game is decided. Each has particular advantages and disadvantages associated with the timing of decisions and the extent of commitments. Each can affect, at least in part, whether or not support for its standard occurs and how much it continues. In the case of the VCR, the potential global market measured hundreds of millions of units. Its very scale created a window of opportunity lasting a few years, during which firms with comparable engineering and manufacturing capabilities could challenge Sony, the first mover in refining the technology for consumers as well as in making preparations to exploit the mass market. As demand grew at rates outstripping the supply capabilities of Sony or any one producer, rapid followers who were also technological pioneers stimulated the occurrence of a first bandwagon that affected the formation of alliances for production and distribution. The emergence of demand for a complementary product-prerecorded tapes (usually movies)-set off a second bandwagon in the 1980s, as retail outlets for tape rental chose to focus on stocking tapes in the format being adopted by a majority of users, even though Sony's original format still enjoyed substantial acceptance. Of particular interest to historians, economists, and students of management strategy is how the initial moves of the main rivals shaped their long-term competitive positions as well as their eventual success or failure in this market. Design technology for video recording had been difficult for Ampex to master but proved more difficult to protect from a select handful of companies that had made audio tape recorders and then invested in the development of video recording. Although Ampex retained control of important patents, Japanese firms challenged these in Japanese courts and also explored ways to invent around them. By the mid-1960s, several firms in Japan, along with Ampex in the United States and Philips in Europe, had accumulated considerable expertise in video recording design and manufacture.
Inventors
Despite a series of products through the 1960s that did not appeal to consumers because of high prices, poor picture quality, bulky housings, and inconvenient reel-to-reel formats, the Japanese pioneers continued to improve their machines until, in 1971, Sony succeeded in designing a cassette model with 3/4 inch-wide tape. This machine, called the U-Matic, was still too large and expensive for regular home use. Nonetheless, it found a market among schools and other institutions, and it embodied the core design concepts that served as the basis for both the Beta and VHS formats.12 In conjunction with an agreement to adopt Sony's U-Matic as a standard for institutional machines, three Japanese firms that later competed for the home video standard-Sony, Matsushita, and JVC-signed a cross-licensing agreement for video recording patents in 1970.13 Philips did not join this group and pursued its own distinctive VCR design.
12 Useful discussions of the concept of a dominant design as well as "architectural" variations, which seem to describe VHS and Beta as refinements of the U-Matic, can be found in Kim B. larger share during 1980-82, as VCR sales boomed with the increasing availability of prerecorded tapes (see Table 3 ).17 Europe was probably a more favorable market in which to promote the use of software than the United States because of the smaller number of television stations and available broadcast programs. Thus, the characteristics of home video-the market's "mass" and global nature, as well as the product's technical complexitymeant that efficient mass production capacity, broad distribution channels, and clear market preferences would require years to emerge. An early mover into the market had no guarantee of a sustainable advantage from simply being first, but needed an effective strategy to capitalize on its position. The need for strategic action was especially strong because other pioneers, after observing customer reactions to the initial product offering, had the option of moving in with a comparable product, lower prices, better features, or superior distribution. In fact, Matsushita was known for competing in that manner: monitoring a broad range of technical developments and gradually building up in-house skills while waiting for Sony, JVC, or other innovative consumerelectronics firms to introduce a new product. Matsushita would then enter the market six months to a year later with a similar but lower-priced version, usually manufactured more efficiently because of Matsushita's mass production skills and willingness to 17 Arthur, "Positive Feedbacks in the Economy." Cusumano, Mylonadis, Rosenbloom / 64 invest to achieve scale economies where they proved useful. The scale of Matsushita manufacturing reflected broad distribution guaranteed through an enormous domestic sales network, which marketed products under brand names that included Panasonic, Technics, National, and Quasar. Matsushita also could schedule large production runs because of its willingness to sell finished products to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in Japan and abroad for sale under their labels.18
The Argument A VCR by itself is worthless. Users can employ it only in conjunction with a complementary product, the videotape cassette, that is designed to conform to the interface specification of the VCR. This is a common characteristic of contemporary information technologies, such as the personal computer (PC) and its software programs, compact disc (CD) players and discs, or TV receivers and broadcast signals. Interface standards for innovative products of this sort can be established by various means: government regulation (the Federal Communications Commission for television), formal agreement among a large number of producers of the primary product (CD players), or implicit acceptance by producers reflecting the market power of a sponsor (IBM PC).
In the case of the VCR, since no single producer or coalition was strong enough to impose a worldwide standard, and since repeated efforts to bring producers to an agreement failed, the marketplace set the standard. Furthermore, the existence of a "network externality" had two important consequences. First, given rival products of approximately equal cost and capabilities, buyers will tend to choose the one that has been chosen, or appears likely to be chosen, by a greater number of other buyers. Second, this creates a dynamic system with a "positive feedback": the perceived benefit of choosing a given standard increases as more buyers choose it, thus increasing the probability of purchase by others not yet in the marketplace. An early lead in this sort of contest, however achieved, may become self-reinforcing.
In the drama of the VCR standardization battle, there were three sets of principal players: 1) the main protagonists, Sony, JVC, and Philips, sponsors of the three principal rival formats and major producers of the core product, the VCR; 2) the remaining consumer electronics producers, each of whom would adopt one of the standard formats for production and/or distribution; and 3) the producers and distributors of an important complementary product, prerecorded software.
As it played out, the crucial battle was between Beta and VHS, Sony and JVC. Table 4 . The decisive factors in the standards battle were few. First, of the six designs being developed around the world in 1974, four were significantly flawed and destined to fail. The Philips N-1500, Sanyo-Toshiba V-Code, and Matsushita VX designs were marketed vigorously yet fell short, despite the introduction of improved second-generation models in each case. RCA's VCR design never got past the prototype stage, since management abandoned the project after seeing the Betamax. Although a later Philips model, the V-2000, had many fine technical features, it proved complex and costly to manufacture and was introduced too late to capture a viable market share. Like RCA, Philips also had a video disc system under development, which distracted management attention away from the VCR; JVC and other Japanese firms also had disc systems under development but concentrated on refining and marketing their VCR machines.
Because of the common technical heritage in the U-Matic, the Beta and VHS designs were closely comparable in cost and performance. Sony had a clear lead primarily in timing; it would take JVC roughly two more years to match the stage that Sony had achieved by late 1974. But moving first was not sufficient, in itself, to win the prize in this market; how Sony moved and what its principal rivals did also mattered. In retrospect, as Akio Morita, Cusumano, Mylonadis, Rosenbloom / 68 then Sony's president, later acknowledged, he and Masaru Ibuka, then chairman, made a "mistake" and "should have worked harder to get more companies together in a 'family' to support the Betamax format."19 JVC, in the number two position, did "try harder" and was more effective at forming alliances in support of VHS.
JVC's more effective campaign to form an alliance behind VHS produced a coalition that matched the Beta family in global market power. JVC and its principal ally (and parent), Matsushita, followed that with strategic commitments that gained a decisive edge in market share for VHS, beginning in 1978. Matsushita exploited its generic skills in mass production and substantial previous experience in VCR manufacture by establishing production capacity for the VHS that exceeded the combined capacities of all other Japanese VCR producers. JVC, meanwhile, moved aggressively to bring leading European consumer electronics firms into the VHS family, almost preempting that market from Beta.
Strategic Alignment of Primary Producers
A set of assumptions that proved to be in conflict shaped Sony's strategy for commercializing the Betamax. Sony's leaders believed that the Beta design was good enough to be a winner, and they knew that they were ahead of their rivals in VCR development. But they also understood that no producer, on its own, could establish a VCR format, however good the design, as a recognized global standard. Thus, Sony set out to interest other VCR pioneers in adopting the Beta format, concentrating especially on winning the allegiance of Matsushita, its most formidable rival. But two premises hampered their ability to recruit allies. As Japan's leading developer of video technology, Sony believed that it should not have to delay commercialization of the Betamax in order to cooperate, and probably compromise, on the development of an industry standard with other firms. Sony managers and engineers felt that their earlier willingness to compromise on the U-Matic had been a competitive error. Consequently, Sony went ahead and began manufacturing preparations for the Betamax in the fall In contrast to Sony, JVC followed a strategy aimed at forming as large a group as possible, aggressively pursuing both licensing and OEM agreements, including exports.28 Management first established a group of adherents in Japan who could boost JVC's manufacturing and marketing capabilities-before completing the design and its own preparations for manufacture. JVC initiated this process in the spring of 1975, shortly after Sony's initial demonstration of the Betamax, and by the end of 1976 had lined up Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and Sharp, in addition to Matsushita. JVC also proposed an OEM relationship to Matsushita, which turned it down because JVC did not have enough capacity to supply Matsushita's huge distribution network and also because Matsushita was capable of producing the VHS machine on its own within a few months.29 In addition, JVC agreed to provide machines to Hitachi, whereas Sony would not; JVC began shipments to Hitachi in December 1976. In January and February 1977, JVC also began supplying VCRs to Sharp and Mitsubishi, which Hitachi had helped to recruit.30
As a second step, toward the end of 1976, JVC moved to establish a footing in the U.S. market by negotiating with RCA. The U.S. company rejected this offer for an OEM relationship because of JVC's small production capacity.31 Yet, rather than giving up on OEM agreements outside Japan, JVC turned toward European firms, which would be satisfied with smaller quantities than RCA needed. JVC pursued these European alliances far more actively and effectively than any other VHS or Beta producer, even after establishing a large production base and gaining worldwide recognition for its brand name (see Table 5 ).
In Table 6 ). The marketing clout wielded by the rival families is worth close analysis, because all the participants understood that VCRs would be sold as adjuncts to television and audio equipment. A rough proxy for market power in that industry in the mid-1970s was a company's share of the color television receiver market. At one level, the rivals appear evenly balanced. Among the world's top ten consumer electronics companies, the VHS and Beta groups were evenly matched, each selling slightly more than onequarter of the color sets sold in 1976 (see Table 4 For example, although Sony's initial models played for one hour and VHS machines two hours, Sony increased its machine's capacity to two hours merely five months after JVC entered the market and several months before Matsushita appeared (see Table  7 ). Sony offered more low-priced models until 1980, when Sanyo introduced inexpensive Beta models. Nevertheless, Matsushita quickly surpassed Sony in share once it entered the VHS market in 1977, and the VHS standard was dominant worldwide by the end of 1978. Beta and VHS offered basic models at similar prices; the VHS group included more brand names, yet Sony led in the 
Mass Production and Mass Distribution
By 1978, the VHS family had gained a significant edge in manufacturing capability, as well as in market power. Both the Beta and VHS machines were complex to manufacture, compared to other consumer electronics products such as radios, televisions, or audio equipment, in particular because they required high precision for machining the heads and sophisticated assembly skills for building the tape-handling mechanism and other components. The difficulty of designing and then mass-producing an inexpensive VCR kept Ampex and RCA from entering this segment of the market in the 1970s, even though both designed home VCR prototypes in Cusumano, Mylonadis, Rosenbloom I 80 their laboratories.39 Philips, in addition to difficulties with product reliability, also had to price its VCRs 20 to 30 percent higher than VHS and Beta machines.40
Both Sony and JVC mastered the problems of mass production engineering and manufacturing, benefiting from experiences gained through earlier video recorder production. They also relied on integrated development teams for the Beta and VHS projects that brought together members with both design and operations backgrounds. JVC, which had less experience making VCRs than Sony, paid special attention to making its VCR easy to manufacture and service by creating a relatively simple, low-cost design with fewer components and assembly steps than the Betamaxcharacteristics that also appealed to companies wishing to license a VCR for in-house manufacturing. In contrast, although Sony had the manufacturing expertise to produce the Betamax economically, potential licensees appeared concerned over their ability to mass produce the Beta design.41
Matsushita also made low-cost production a major priority as it modified the VHS design and prepared its own plants. The company spent at least fourteen months studying manufacturing issues before formally adopting the VHS standard in January 1977. Matsushita engineers knew what problems to expect, because they had accumulated invaluable experience producing earlier VCR machines, including a cartridge model once made in a plant with 1,200 workers and a monthly capacity of 10,000 units, as well as the VX cassette model, which Matsushita had made in 1976 before switching to the VHS.42 Matsushita not only emphasized a reduction in parts but also invested in manufacturing automation and scheduled large production runs, anticipating that its vast distribution system would enable it to sell a great number of VCRs.43 Matsushita's ability to deliver low-priced VCRs with an increasing variety of features also helped it undercut Sony prices and win contracts to supply machines to overseas distributors-arrangements that further increased Matsushita's scale of operations and ability to justify additional investments in product development and automation.44 Managers at Matsushita believed that the manufacturer who would dominate the world market would be the company that captured the largest share of the U.S. market, where the major VCR distributors were likely to be RCA and Zenith, the leaders in color television sales.45 Sony moved first after developing a twohour model by establishing a relationship with Zenith, after having been rebuffed by RCA. RCA intended to lead in the market for home video players but wanted lower-priced machines as well as a longer recording time. Meanwhile, Matsushita took a strong interest in RCA's distribution resources. These mutual interests brought RCA and Matsushita together in negotiations for an OEM agreement after discussions broke down between RCA and JVC, which did not have the manufacturing capacity to supply RCA with the volume of machines it wanted.
As RCA managers pondered which Japanese producer with which to link up, they reconsidered the issue of tape length. In percent of the total Japanese VCR production capacity of 191,000 units per month (see Table 9 ). Matsushita-not JVC-thus proved instrumental in winning over RCA and pushing the VCR competition toward the areas where Sony was weakest: low prices and mass distribution, as well as longer playing and recording times. JVC personnel opposed a doubling of the playing time, arguing that this constituted a "bastardization" of the VHS (that is, a compromise in picture quality), and they refrained from collaborating with Matsushita in pursuing this feature. JVC eventually built a two-speed (two-and four-hour) machine in August 1977, primarily to satisfy its OEM partners, but not until July 1979 did it introduce such a machine commercially under the JVC brand name.47 JVC, which had about one-tenth the sales volume of Matsushita, also took six months to build a machine with four-hour play and twelve months to achieve a monthly capacity of 10,000 units.48 Most important, the nature of competition changed as a result of Matsushita's alliance with RCA. First, momentum clearly built up for VHS in the U.S. market, as General Electric, Sylvania, Magnavox, and Curtis Mathes scrambled to join this group in 1977, under the rationale that the format RCA supported would probably become the dominant machine in the American market.49 U.S. distributors initially had been indifferent to the choice of standards and appeared to be waiting for clearer market signals before selecting a format. Second, because of the longer playing time, Matsushita and its distributors, and later other firms in the VHS group, were able to establish an image of the Beta machine as deficient with respect to this basic feature. Sony increased the Betamax's playing time to three hours in October 1978, but not until March 1979, a year and a half after Matsushita introduced the four-hour VHS, did Sony introduce a 4.5-hour machine (see Table 7 ).
Thus, by spring 1977 Matsushita was able to plan a large-scale entry into the worldwide VCR market and to begin exploiting its skills and investments in low-cost manufacturing and mass distribution. These assets, in turn, helped RCA, which had brand recognition as well as extensive distribution channels, to offer reliable products at low prices. The effective Matsushita-RCA combination then damaged Sony's competitive position in both the U.S. and Japanese markets, not only because Sony's market share and distinctiveness declined. Shortly after RCA's announcement of a reduction in prices to undercut Sony in August 1977, Zenith demanded a renegotiation of its OEM agreement with Sony, to whom it was paying $100 more for Beta machines than RCA paid Matsushita for VHS machines.50 After a lag of more than two months, Sony and Zenith responded by matching RCA's prices.51 Yet these moves portended a difficult future: Sony would now play the game on terms that Matsushita and RCA had set, and play it poorly. In fact, Sony had trouble matching the prices of both Matsushita and JVC in the low end of the VCR market between 1979 and 1981 (see Fig. 1 ). Sanyo took over as the primary supplier of the lowest-priced Beta machines, but it did not have the range of alliances or the distribution channels to which Matsushita had access.
Strategic Alignment for Complementary Products
Of the three principal functions of the VCR-namely, "timeshifting" (recording broadcast programs for later viewing), making and viewing home movies, and playing prerecorded cassette programs-only in the last one did the greater availability of VHS prove to be a significant factor for consumers. Blank cassettes used for time-shifting and movies were readily available for both machines. The format did represent a potential constraint on the sharing of these tapes among households, once recorded, but such use remained small. On the other hand, users quickly perceived In April 1975, Sony enjoyed what looked like an insurmountable lead. Its Betamax, already on the market in Japan, was clearly superior to VCRs being offered by major rivals-Matsushita, Sanyo, Toshiba, and Philips. The company had a lustrous reputation globally as an innovator and leader in consumer electronics. JVC, a minor factor in the industry, was still struggling to perfect VHS prototypes that seemed to offer few evident technological advantages. Matsushita was struggling with its poorly received VX product. Two years later, though Beta still enjoyed a lead, JVC, supported by Matsushita, set in motion the fundamental forces that would continually erode, and then extinguish, Beta's share of a massive global market.
In retrospect, it is possible to identify the key events and to "explain" the outcome in terms of a few factors. But as events were unfolding, the implications of each strategic move must have been more difficult to discern. Each of the key protagonists acted in a way that made sense in context. Sony's behavior followed patterns that had brought it great success over two decades. JVC, the underdog, could not reasonably have been less humble or flexible in its relationships. Matsushita, along with Toshiba, Sanyo, and Philips, were actually failed first movers, since they introduced unsuccessful VCRs at nearly the same time as the Betamax. Matsushita, however, exhibited its usual mixture of caution and flexibility. Had the market grown more slowly, as nearly all observers expected, Sony might have been able to respond more effectively to its early mistakes and to the actions of its key competitors.
A few important moves made the difference. JVC created a winning alignment of VCR producers in Japan by the way its managers conducted the formation of alliances, showing versatility and humility, whereas Sony pressed commitment and reputation. The alliance with the giant Matsushita brought huge added benefits. Matsushita's management waited until VHS seemed likely to be a viable alternative to Betamax before abandoning its own VX model and then quickly switched over to the new machines, investing massively in capacity in advance of demand while pushing the product technology to meet RCA's requirements of a longer recording time. JVC completed the sweep by moving ahead of Sony to enlist a huge number of European partners behind VHS. JVC's early success in aligning itself with Matsushita and other Cusumano, Mylonadis, Rosenbloom I 88 Japanese producers allowed the company to gain a decisive edge in the race for distribution rights. Sony's reluctance to be an OEM supplier, and its underestimation of the threat from VHS, left Beta in a minority position for potential market power in North America and Western Europe as well as in Japan. As the theories discussed in this article suggest, once VHS took the lead, it became more and more likely that it would continue to gain share year after year. The final contest, among producers and distributors of video software, accelerated this process. Even without the growing importance of software, the outcome probably would have been the same in the long run. Nonetheless, the dominance of VHS in tape-rental channels hastened the demise of Beta and made certain it would not survive even as a second format. Louis Pasteur said that "chance favors the prepared mind." Chance no doubt played a role in the dynamic growth of the VCR industry and the eventual success of VHS. But the alliances that JVC formed for production and distribution and the timely strategic commitments of its ally, Matsushita, proved to be the decisive factors in the triumph of VHS over Beta. 
